Do markets encourage risk-seeking behaviour? by Mengel, F. & Peeters, R.J.A.P.
  
 
Do markets encourage risk-seeking behaviour?
Citation for published version (APA):
Mengel, F., & Peeters, R. J. A. P. (2015). Do markets encourage risk-seeking behaviour? (GSBE
Research Memoranda; No. 042). Maastricht: GSBE.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2015
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 Friederike Mengel, Ronald Peeters 
 
Do markets encourage risk-
seeking behaviour? 
 
 
RM/15/042 
Do markets encourage risk-seeking behaviour?∗
Friederike Mengel †
University of Essex and
Maastricht University
Ronald Peeters ‡
Maastricht University
December 2015
Abstract
Excessive risk taking in markets can have devastating consequences as recent financial crises have high-
lighted. In this paper we ask whether markets as an institution encourage such excessive risk taking. To
establish causality, we isolate the effects of market interaction in a laboratory experiment keeping other
possibly confounding factors constant. We find that the opposite is true. Markets decrease participants’
willingness to take risks. This finding can be explained by social comparison utility in the presence of
negatively correlated risks and we provide evidence for such a mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Markets are ubiquitous in modern society (North, 1991). We interact in markets to trade goods, services and
information and they affect most aspects of our everyday life. Markets have been praised for their ability
to efficiently aggregate expectations and information from disparate traders, thereby allocating resources
more efficiently than central authority and governments (Hayek, 1945). However, there is a dark side as
well. Evidence that market interactions may go along with the risk of moral decay has recently been
the subject of a keen debate in politics, ethics and in the social sciences, including economics (Shleifer,
2004; Falk and Szech, 2013; Bartling et al., 2015). One particular aspect of moral hazard that received
increasing attention during the latest economic crisis is that incentives provided by markets may encourage
risk taking behaviour (Bernanke, 2008; Porcelli and Delgado, 2009; Dong et al., 2010). Indeed, certain key
aspects of many markets, such as competition, have traditionally been considered a source of excessive risk
taking (Matutes and Vives, 2000). Excessive risk taking behaviour can impose negative externalities on
society, such as mispricing of goods and services and risks of bankruptcy, financial contagion and crises with
correspondingly large losses for society (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).
In this study, we investigate whether markets induce risk taking behaviour. The ideal experiment to
identify a causal effect of markets on risk taking behaviour involves the comparison of different institutions
at the same time in identical, but distinct societies with no interactions or feedback effects between them.
To come as close as possible to this ideal, we conducted a laboratory experiment in which we randomly
assign subjects to different institutional environments. In treatments with market interaction (the market
treatments) assets are traded via a call auction mechanism (Plott and Smith, 2008). In the non-market
treatments prices of assets are determined via a BDM mechanism. In all treatments two assets are traded in
parallel markets, where one asset is more risky than the other in the sense of mean-preserving spreads. Risk
taking behaviour is measured by studying and comparing the prices of these two assets. The information
available to participants across these treatment variations is exactly identical. The only difference is how
prices are determined. Both treatments exist in two versions: one where information about the outcomes
of other market participants is provided and one where such social comparison information is absent. This
completes our 2× 2 design.
Somewhat surprisingly, we find that markets decrease participants’ willingness to take risks. This is
the case, however, if and only if information about the outcomes of other market participants is provided.
In the absence of such social comparison information, risk premia in markets do not differ from those in
the non-market settings. These findings can be explained by social comparison utility in the presence of
negatively correlated risks. We discuss this as well as other possible mechanisms.
Our results contribute to two different strands of literature, one focusing on how social comparison affects
behaviour in market settings and another one focused on the determinants of risk premia in markets.
Gortner and van der Weele (2015) study willingness to take risks in a portfolio choice setting designed to
test the Arrow-Debreu predictions on risk-sharing. They find that both imitation and positional preferences
play a role for risk-taking. Unlike our study, they do not compare markets with equivalent non-market
settings. A second important difference is that in their design, trades do not imply negative correlation
of risk. The correlation structure of risk is crucial to predict how social comparison is expected to affect
risk premia. Literature on experimental asset markets has often focused on bubble formation. Within that
setting both Oechssler et al. (2011) and Schoenberg and Haruvy (2012) have asked how social comparison
information affects the prevalence of price bubbles. Schoenberg and Haruvy (2012) find that observing the
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earnings of the highest earning market participant increases the prevalence of bubbles. There are also a
number of field studies using information on social ties or the spatial distribution of traders to establish
that peer decisions matter for stock market participation and trading decisions (Hong et al., 2005; Bursztyn
et al., 2014).
To our knowledge there is only one paper comparing markets with equivalent non-market settings in
a laboratory experiment. This study by Bohm et al. (1997), however, focuses on how to best design a
BDM mechanism in order to elicit prices that differ as little as possible from the corresponding market
design. Our study shows that any such comparison will depend on whether social comparison information
is provided. While the market and the BDM setting yield the same risk premia in the absence of social
comparison information, this is no longer the case once such information is provided. Two other recent
studies compared market and non-market interaction in settings in which studying risk-taking behaviour
is not easily possible. Falk and Szech (2013) study morality in markets by comparing a setting where
individuals make a decision about whether or not to avoid the killing of a mouse at a monetary cost and
one where the decision involved trading in a double auction market. They found that more mice were
killed in the market setting concluding that markets erode morals. Bartling et al. (2015) study social
responsibility in markets. They compare single person allocation tasks (like dictator games) as non-market
settings with product markets where low-cost production creates negative externalities. While each of these
studies produces interesting results on morality in markets, their designs are not suited to (nor meant to)
study risk-taking behaviour.
Our study also points to social comparison utility as one important channel affecting risk premia. It
hence contributes to a larger literature trying to understand what determines risk premia in financial decision
making. Within this context particularly related are Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Wachter (2006) or
Aldrich and Gallant (2011) who show that models involving habit formation can explain asset prices and
short- and long-run equity premium puzzles.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our experimental design. Section 3 presents the
main results. Section 4 discusses mechanisms and Section 5 concludes.
2 Methods
The ideal experiment to identify a causal effect of markets on risk taking behaviour involves the comparison
of different institutions at the same time in identical, but distinct societies with no interactions or feedback
effects between them. To come as close as possible to this ideal, we conducted a laboratory experiment in
which we randomly assign subjects to different institutional environments. In order to isolate the effect of
market interaction, we implemented two institutional settings with equal decision frameworks, incentives
and informational conditions, and that only differed in whether subjects’ incentives were based on market
interactions or not. In both environments, a group of five agents traded assets in two parallel but isolated
markets. In each trading period all agents started with one unit of each asset in stock. Next, they simul-
taneously and independently specified for each asset their selling price and buying price. The selling price
indicates for which price they are willing to sell their unit; the buying price indicates for which price they
are willing to buy a second unit.
In the treatments with market interaction (the market treatments) assets are traded via a call auction
mechanism (Plott and Smith, 2008). Trade occurs when some subject’s buying price is above another
subject’s selling price. The market price is the price at which all possible trades can take place simultaneously.
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In case no trade is possible (i.e. when the highest buying price is below the lowest selling price), no market
price is determined; when there are multiple prices at which the market clears, the market price is the
average of these. After each trading period, subjects are informed about the market price.
In the treatments without market interaction (the nonmarket treatments), purchases and sales of stocks
were determined according to a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). Instead
of assets being bought or sold at the market price, subjects’ purchases and sales were determined by a
randomly drawn price. Subjects with a selling price below the random price sell their unit and those with a
buying price above this random price buy a second unit. To equalize the information flow with the market
treatment, the fictitious market price was communicated after each trading period.1
In all treatments subjects interacted within fixed groups during three repetitions of ten trading periods.
At the beginning of each repetition all subjects were informed that each asset has a return of either 50,
100 or 150, but they did not know the probability distribution of returns. The probabilities associated with
these three outcomes were 1/5, 3/5 and 1/5 for one asset and 2/5, 1/5 and 2/5 for the other asset. Hence,
both assets had an equal expected value of 100, but differed in riskiness: one asset was more risky than the
other in the sense of mean-preserving spreads. Each subject received one possible return value as a signal
and they knew that the probability to receive a particular return value as signal was equal to the probability
that the asset returns this value. Hence, even though the signal is far from perfect, it is informative. Signals
were randomly allocated in such a manner that on aggregate perfect information on the return probabilities
was available in the group. The fact that there are no information asymmetries means our design is less
conducive to strategic manipulation. The asset markets and signal distributions were kept constant within
each repetition, but varied across repetitions (Appendix A).
Both the market and the nonmarket treatments were run in two informational variations: one where after
each trading period subjects were informed about others’ buying and asking prices (with social comparison
(SC) information), and one where they did not receive such information (without SC information). The
former mimics markets with higher transparency where traders typically know each others’ market outcomes,
such as many exchange markets or online trading platforms (zulutrade.com, etoro.com) where other trader’s
outcomes can be observed. The latter is closer to more opaque markets where little information about
others’ outcomes is available, such as some over-the-counter (OTC) markets or dark pools.
The experiments were conducted in the BEElab, the experimental laboratory at Maastricht University,
in November 2014 and June 2015. We recruited undergraduate students from various disciplines via ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). All interactions took place anonymously via computer clients that where connected to a
central server using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions and screenshots are provided in Appendices B
and C. At the end of the experiment, subjects participated in a short questionnaire in which we elicited
a few personal characteristics (see Appendix D). In total, 160 students participated in the experiment: 8
groups of five per treatment (see Appendix E for information on our subject pool). A typical session lasted
about 90 minutes and the average payoff was 15.26 Euros (including a 5.00 Euro show-up fee).
1There has been some discussion on whether the BDM mechanism is incentive compatible under non-expected utility pref-
erences (Karni and Safra, 1987). As will become clear below in our experiment we only use the mechanism in a treatment
comparison with the market setting and not to e.g. elicit certainty equivalents. Hence, whether or not the mechanism is
incentive compatible is not of primary importance for the present purpose.
4
3 Results
We are interested in the extent of risk-taking across the four conditions. We measure the extent of risk-
taking by the premium participants require to incur risks. A risk premium is usually defined as the return
in excess of the risk-free rate an asset is expected to yield to compensate the investor for the risk s/he is
taking. Since both assets in our setting yield the same expected return, we define the risk premium here as
the difference in market price between the less and the more risky asset. This risk premium thus defined
measures how much the market values avoiding risk. If incentives created by market interactions were to
encourage risk seeking behaviour, we should observe a lower risk premium in the market treatment than in
the nonmarket treatment.
(a) without SC information (b) with SC information
Figure 1: Development of average risk premium in the different treatments.
Figure 1 shows the average risk premium over time in the treatment with (black) and without (grey)
market interaction; the left panel shows the treatments without and the right panel for those with SC
information. For the treatments without SC information, the average risk premium hovers around zero
for both the market and the nonmarket treatment. For the treatments with SC information, the average
risk premium again is around zero for the nonmarket treatment but becomes larger over time for the
market treatment. There seems to be no difference between the market and nonmarket setting without SC
information, while with SC information participants seem less willing to take risks in the market setting.
While risk premia are around zero in all treatments except the market treatment with SC information, both
assets are priced substantially below their expected value of 100 (Table 4 in Appendix G) indicating risk
aversion in all treatments.
In order to assess statistical significance of the treatment effects on risk premia, we ran a random-effects
OLS regression estimating the following equation:
RP tj = α+ β1 × Market + β2 × SCinfo + β3 × SCinfo× Market + ηj + tj , (1)
where RP tj refers to the risk premium of group j in period t, Market is a dummy for the market treatments
and SCinfo a dummy for the presence of social comparison information. Table 1 presents the results. Of
particular interest are the coefficients β1 measuring the impact of market interactions in the absence of SC
information and the coefficient β1 + β3 measuring the impact of market interactions with SC information.
Market interaction decreases the willingness to take risks if and only if there is SC information. While β1
is small, changing in sign and statistically not significant, the coefficient β1 + β3 is substantial and growing
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 6–10 16–20 26–30
Constant (α) 1.042 1.974 1.995 2.034
(2.094) (3.960) (4.166) (3.590)
Market (β1) 0.008 −0.801 −3.401 −1.642
(3.121) (4.494) (6.327) (3.516)
SCinfo (β2) −1.982 −0.465 −1.033 −3.480
(1.617) (6.894) (5.289) (4.241)
SCinfo × Market (β3) 6.556∗∗ 4.198 7.714 13.09∗∗∗
(3.151) (9.340) (8.393) (4.028)
β1 + β3 6.564
∗ 3.379 4.313 11.448∗∗
p-value test β1 + β3 = 0 0.073 0.590 0.548 0.044
β2 + β3 4.574 3.733 6.681 9.610
∗
p-value test β2 + β3 = 0 0.195 0.526 0.147 0.063
Observations 880 152 152 152
Number of groups 32 32 32 32
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 1: Difference in risk premium between treatments. Column (1) shows all data, Columns (2)–(4) focus
on mature behavior in the second half of each of the three repetitions, i.e. rounds 6–10, 16–20 and 26–30. Note
that the number of observations is smaller than 960 (32*30) or 160 (32*5), respectively. The reason is that in
some periods there was no trade for at least one of the assets. In these cases the market price for that asset
and the risk premium are set to missing.
over time. Across the last 5 periods the risk premium in “transparent markets” is more than 11 tokens
higher, a more than 500% increase over the corresponding nonmarket setting (Column (4) in Table 1).
Despite the fact that excessive risk-taking with all its consequences occurs frequently in markets, we find
that markets are not causal to such behaviour. By contrast, markets even reduce risk in the presence of social
comparison information, suggesting that markets may not be the worst institution to discipline excessive
risk-taking.
Further analysis and robustness checks reveal that the effect is stronger if the initial distribution of
signals seems favorable to the less risky asset for a greater number of participants (Table 5 in Appendix G).
Controlling for participants’ personality and demographic characteristics elicited in a post-experimental
questionnaire does not affect the estimated coefficient size β1 + β3 substantially. Effect sizes tend to be
even bigger and statistical significance improves once these controls are included (Table 8 in Appendix G).
Finally, we also analyzed time trends and did not find statistically significant time trends within treatments
(Table 7 in Appendix G). Results are also robust when considering an alternative implementation of the
nonmarket condition described in Appendix I.
The coefficient β2 + β3 shows the effect of adding social comparison information to markets. This
coefficient being positive indicates that increasing transparency in markets disciplines risk-seeking behaviour.
The statistical significance of this effect is only marginal in Table 1, but increases as individual characteristics
of market participants are controlled for (see Table 8 in Appendix G).
4 Discussion
Why does market interaction decrease participants’ willingness to take risks? In this section we show how
social comparison preferences can increase risk premia in markets. We then discuss alternative mechanisms.
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The fact that markets decrease willingness to take risks if and only if social comparison information is
provided suggests that the latter plays an important role in explaining the effect of markets on risk-taking
behaviour. Social comparison information will matter, for example, if people have social reference points, i.e.
if they evaluate their outcomes relative to the outcomes of others. In fact, there is a solid body of evidence
demonstrating loss aversion with respect to social reference points (Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007; Kuhn et al.,
2011; Linde and Sonnemans, 2012). It can be shown that if participants have reference dependent preferences
with respect to a social reference point, then our markets will induce higher risk premia whenever social
comparison information is provided. The correlation structure of risk plays an important role for this effect.
To see this note that when a given asset is traded, risk is negatively correlated: what one side of the market
gains, the other side loses. One implication of such negative correlation is that risk premia in the market
condition are increasing in the extent to which social comparison utility matters to individuals.
We establish this point more formally by building on the model of reference dependent preferences
developed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). Following Schmidt et al. (2015), we then incorporate a social
comparison reference point into the model. Consider an agent i facing a lottery with K outcomes xk and
associated probabilities pk (k = 1, . . . ,K). We denote by r` (` = 1, . . . , L) the agent’s social comparison
reference point and consider a probability distribution pk` over pairs (xk, r`). Let the agent’s utility V be
given by
V = η
[∑
k pk u(xk)
]
+ ψ
[∑
k,` pk` v(u(xk)− u(r`))
]
. (2)
The term in the first pair of squared brackets is the expected (consumption) utility of the gamble (asset)
held, where we assume u to be concave. The parameter η is the weight on consumption utility and ψ captures
the weight on gain–loss or social comparison utility. Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we assume that
v is continuous, strictly increasing and steeper for losses than for gains. In our market setting with five
agents, two assets and each agent possibly holding multiple units of each assets, the space of possible pairs
(xk, r`) (as well as the number of possible definitions of r`) is quite big. Though, in order to understand
how social comparison affects the risk premium in markets it suffices to consider a simple trade between two
agents i and j where the high risk asset (HR) is swapped for the low-risk asset (LR). Assume that i’s social
comparison reference point is j’s outcome x and vice versa. Under these assumptions it can be shown that
the risk premium defined as V LRi − V HRi is increasing in ψ (Appendix F).
In other words, in markets where trades make outcomes negatively correlated, the risk premium will
increase in the extent to which participants care about social comparison. In the nonmarket treatments,
where risks are idiosyncratic, social comparison information should not affect risk premia, which is consistent
with our evidence (Schmidt et al., 2015). Consistently with this social comparison explanation, we also find
that participants are less eager to hold assets at all: Both assets are priced lower with market interactions
(Table 6 in Appendix G). At this point it should be noted that not any trade in markets implies negative
correlation of risk. Depending on their portfolio, market participants can swap different assets to reduce
risk for both (Gortner and van der Weele, 2015). In our setting, however, this is not possible. Any trade of
a given asset does necessarily involve negative correlation.
Some other possible mechanisms seem worth pointing out. First, reference-dependent preferences with
probability weighting (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) have been linked with a preference for positively
skewed securities (Barberis and Huang, 2008). Such a mechanism, however, cannot explain any of our
treatment differences, because it should operate in the same way in the market and nonmarket condition
and with and without social comparison information. Second, while in the BDM the distribution of prices
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is uniform, in the market this is typically not the case. This differences in the distributions of prices could
lead traders to be perceived as more risk averse in the market setting under non-expected utility theory
(Machina, 1982). However, we study risk premia comparing high and low risk assets and it is not clear why
they should be affected by this difference. Moreover, we find that markets lead to increased risk aversion
if and only if social comparison information is provided; distributional differences alone cannot account for
this effect.
5 Conclusions
We investigated whether markets induce risk taking behaviour. We isolate the effects of market interaction
keeping other possibly confounding factors constant. Somewhat surprisingly, we found that markets decrease
participants’ willingness to take risks. This is the case, however, if and only if information about the outcomes
of other market participants is provided. In the absence of such social comparison information, risk premia
in markets do not differ from those in the non-market settings. Our findings can be explained by social
comparison utility in the presence of negatively correlated risks.
It is important to note that our results do not question the fact that frequently we do observe excessive
risk-taking in markets. There is ample evidence demonstrating that this can indeed be the case. What
they do question, however, is whether market interaction is causal to such risk taking. Our results suggest
that it is other factors, such as specific aspects of remuneration packages, bonuses paid to financial traders,
self-selection into trading or individual factors (see e.g. Kuhnen and Knutson (2005); Porcelli and Delgado
(2009); Coates et al. (2009)) that cause excessive risk taking in financial markets. Evidence from our
post experimental questionnaire gives some clues into which individual factors affect pricing. Risk premia
are higher if market participants are more risk averse or have higher cognitive ability and they are lower
if participants are male, more optimistic, conscientious or neurotic according to measures elicited in the
questionnaire (Table 8 in Appendix G). Market interaction, by contrast, tends to mitigate excessive risk-
taking rather than exacerbate it at least in our setting. We cannot rule out that in other market settings
(e.g. with a different correlation structure of risk), different effects will be observed. Our results do show,
however, that there is no general tendency for markets to induce risk-taking behaviour.
Our results suggest some possibilities to harness social comparison effects to discourage excessive risk
taking. In some online platforms (zulutrade.com; etoro.com), for example, individual investors can observe
outcomes of other market participants and can even decide to mimic their strategies. In other markets, by
contrast, there is only limited transparency and if at all outcomes of only few market participants can be
observed. Since, adding social comparison information increases risk premia, this could be one channel why
less risky behaviour is observed in exchanges compared to OTC or such dark pool markets. Our results
hence contribute to the debate around recent legislation (Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. and the “Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II)” in the EU) that aims at providing transparency to dark pools,
or even disallowing them altogether. Future research should study how robust our findings are and if there
are interaction effects when different institutional details are considered. Future experiments could vary the
number and correlation structure of assets, the shape of information flows, how traders are remunerated,
etc.
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A Design Details and Procedures
Parameter settings Table 2 presents the parameter settings for the different matching groups in the
different repetitions. In all matching groups the left (right) asset was referred to as the red (green) asset in
the first repetition, as the yellow (purple) asset in the second repetition and as the blue (orange) asset in the
third repetition. Across matching groups and repetitions there was variation in whether the left or the right
asset was the more or less risky one. Moreover, the distribution of signals differed across matching groups
and repetitions. We adopted two different distributions of signals: In distribution ρ1 (ρ2) three individuals
receive a signal that the more (less) risky asset is marginally better, one that the less (more) risky asset is
marginally better, and one that the less (more) risky asset is way better.
For instance, in matching group 3 and repetition 2 the left (yellow) asset was less risky than the right
(purple) asset and the signal distribution was in accordance to distribution ρ1 with individuals 1, 2 and
4 receiving a signal that the more risky asset is marginally better, individual 3 that the less risky asset is
marginally better, and individual 5 that the less risky asset is way better.
Matching group 1–2 3–4 5–6 7–8
Repetition 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Color asset L red yellow blue red yellow blue red yellow blue red yellow blue
Color asset R green purple orange green purple orange green purple orange green purple orange
Return L [1] 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Return L [2] 100 50 50 50 100 100 100 50 100 50 100 50
Return L [3] 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Return L [4] 100 150 150 150 100 100 100 150 100 150 100 150
Return L [5] 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Return R [1] 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Return R [2] 50 100 100 100 50 50 50 100 50 100 50 100
Return R [3] 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Return R [4] 150 100 100 100 150 150 150 100 150 100 150 100
Return R [5] 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Signal L [1] 100 150 50 100 100 100 100 50 50 150 100 150
Signal L [2] 50 150 150 50 50 100 50 150 100 100 150 50
Signal L [3] 100 50 100 150 100 50 150 50 100 150 100 150
Signal L [4] 100 50 50 50 100 150 100 150 150 50 100 100
Signal L [5] 150 100 150 150 150 100 100 100 100 50 50 50
Signal R [1] 150 50 150 50 150 50 50 100 150 50 150 100
Signal R [2] 100 100 100 100 100 50 150 100 150 150 100 150
Signal R [3] 50 100 50 100 50 150 100 150 50 100 50 100
Signal R [4] 150 100 100 150 150 100 150 100 100 100 50 50
Signal R [5] 50 150 100 100 50 150 50 50 50 100 150 100
Distribution ρ1 ρ2 ρ1 ρ1 ρ1 ρ2 ρ2 ρ1 ρ2 ρ2 ρ2 ρ1
Table 2: Parameter settings.
Strategic manipulation There is not much evidence of strategic manipulation in experimental double
auction markets even in settings that were designed to encourage such manipulation (Veiga and Vorsatz,
2009). Our setting is less conducive to strategic manipulation, because there are no informational asym-
metries. Hence, none of the participants should feel that they have an informational advantage they could
potentially capitalize on. Finally, even if some participants did try to attempt to manipulate prices, it is
not clear how this should differentially affect the more and less risky assets and hence the risk premium.
Sources of financial support The payments to the participants in the experiments were covered by the
private research budget provided by the departments of the authors. Both authors were partly supported
by personal research grants from the Dutch Science Foundation (NWO Veni and Vidi grants).
11
Ethical approval The experiments were conducted at the BEElab, the experimental laboratory of the
School of Business and Economics of Maastricht University (where both authors were affiliated at the time
the experiment was conducted). Experiments can only be conducted at the BEElab after the design and
procedures have been presented at a “proposal meeting” and subsequently have found approval of the lab-
manager and the other lab-members present at the meeting. This internal approval process, that screens in
accordance to the ruling international standards of economic experiments, replaces an official IRB approval
(which is to date rather uncommon in the Netherlands).
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B Sample Instructions (Market–SCinfo)
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please, read these instructions carefully. They are
identical for all the participants with whom you will interact during this experiment. If you have a question,
please, raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to you and answer your questions. From now
on communication with other participants is not allowed. If you do not conform to these rules we are sorry
to have to exclude you from the experiment. Please do also switch off your mobile phone at this moment.
At the end of the experiment you will receive a payment. How much you get depends on your decisions
and those of other participants. During the experiment the earnings are expressed in ECU (Experimental
Currency Units). At the end of the experiment the ECUs collected are converted into Euros according to
the exchange rate 1 ECU = 5 Eurocents. In addition there is the 5 Euro show up fee. All your decisions
will be treated confidentially.
The experiment
There will be two different assets in this experiment, which will be labeled with different colors. In these
instructions we will talk about the BLACK asset and the WHITE asset. In the experiment, however,
different colors will be used.
Both assets have one of the following three possible returns: 50 ECU, 100 ECU or 150 ECU. The difference
between the two assets is the probabilities with which these possible returns realize. In other words the
chance to get 50 or 100 or 150 is different for the BLACK compared to the WHITE asset. The only thing
you know is that each of these returns is possible with positive probability for both assets.
One way to think about this is that both the BLACK and the WHITE asset represent an envelope with
money containing bills of 50 ECU, 100 ECU and 150 ECU. The difference is that the BLACK and WHITE
envelope might contain different numbers of each of these bills. The only thing you know is that in each
envelope there is at least one bill of each kind.
In total the experiment consists of three repetitions. In each repetition there will be different assets. You
can trade assets in each repetition for ten trading periods.
Signal
At the beginning of each repetition you receive a signal. A signal is a piece of information for you about
each of the assets. You will receive the following signal. For each asset we will tell you one number 50, 100
or 150. The probability with which we tell you each of these numbers corresponds to the probability with
which the asset has this return. Hence the higher the probability that the asset has a certain return, the
higher the chance that we show you this number.
In terms of our envelope example you can think about your signal as follows. We randomly draw one bill
out of each envelope and show it to you. Hence the more bills of a certain type an envelope contains, the
more likely it is that we draw one of these.
In the experiment you will be matched with four other participants in a group. Not only you, but also all
of the other group members will receive a signal in the same manner as you. Note, however, that different
participants might receive different signals.
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The trading
In each trading period, you have one share of each asset (BLACK and WHITE) in stock. You will tell us
two numbers:
(i) your buying price: this is the maximum price at which you are willing to buy one more share of this
asset, and
(ii) your selling price: this is the minimum price at which you are willing to sell your share of this asset.
Hence, in total you will tell us four numbers, two for each asset.
All group members will tell us their four numbers simultaneously. Afterwards, for each asset BLACK and
WHITE, the buying prices of all group members are ranked highest to lowest and the selling prices of all
group members are ranked lowest to highest.
The market price of each asset is determined as follows:
1. First we compare the lowest selling price with the highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then there is no market price (which we will
mark with xxx).
• Otherwise, we proceed to 2.
2. Compare the second-lowest selling price with the second-highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the average of the
lowest selling price and the highest buying price.
• Otherwise, we proceed with 3.
3. Compare the third-lowest selling price with the third-highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the average of the
second-lowest selling price and the second-highest buying price.
• Otherwise, we proceed to 4.
4. Compare the fourth-lowest selling price with the fourth-highest buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the average of the
third-lowest selling price and the third-highest buying price.
• Otherwise, we proceed to 5.
5. Compare the fifth-lowest (or highest) selling price with the fifth-highest (or lowest) buying price.
• If this selling price is higher than this buying price, then the market price is the average of the
fourth-lowest selling price and the fourth-highest buying price.
• Otherwise, the market price is the average of this fifth-lowest selling price and this fifth-highest
buying price.
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For example, assume that, for some asset, the five buying prices are (5400, 100, 21, 7, 1) and the selling
prices are (8, 24, 65, 201, 300). The lowest selling price of 8 is lower than the highest buying price of 5400.
Hence, we proceed to step 2. The second-lowest selling price of 24 is lower than the second-highest buying
price of 100. Hence, we proceed to step 3. The third-lowest selling price of 65 is higher than the third-highest
buying price of 21. Hence, two shares are traded in your group and the market price is the average between
the second-lowest selling price of 24 and the second-highest buying price of 100, which is 62.
Once the market price is determined, all group members with buying prices above the market price and with
selling prices below the market price will trade one share of the asset (at the market price). In case there
is excess demand or excess supply, group members with higher buying prices and lower selling prices will
trade first. In case of ties (equal buying prices or equal selling prices) between group members, a random
selection of these will be trading.
Information
At the end of each period you will observe for each asset (BLACK and WHITE):
• the market price;
• the buying and selling prices of all group members;
• whether you sold the asset, you bought the asset, or did not make any trade at all.
Your earnings in the experiment
At the end of the experiment one period is randomly drawn. Your earnings in the experiment are based on
your payoff from that randomly drawn period.
First the return of the BLACK and the WHITE asset (either 50, 100 or 150) are determined according to
the respective probabilities. In terms of our envelope example you can think of one bill being randomly
drawn from the BLACK and one from the WHITE envelope.
Your payoff in this period is then computed as follows:
Payoff = Number of shares of BLACK asset× Return of BLACK asset
+ Number of shares of WHITE asset× Return of WHITE asset
− Market price BLACK asset if a share of this asset is bought
+ Market price BLACK asset if a share of this asset is sold
− Market price WHITE asset if a share of this asset is bought
+ Market price WHITE asset if a share of this asset is sold
Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment there will be a short questionnaire for you to fill in.
If you have any questions about these instructions or the experiment, then please raise your hand now and
someone will come and answer them. Once everyone has finished reading the instructions some control
questions will appear on your screen that will allow you to test your understanding of the instructions.
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C Screenshots (Market–SCinfo)
Figure 2: Start of a new repetition. Before each sequence of ten trading periods, participants get notified
via this screen that a new repetition of ten trading periods starts. Across repetitions, color-names of assets,
the realization probabilities of the possible return values, and the signals are different (see Table 2); within
repetitions these are constant.
Figure 3: Decision screen. At the upper-left part of the screen, individuals are notified on their identity within
the group (where the figure at the upper-right shows the group; dashed line are not present in the treatments
without SC information), the number of shares of each asset in stock (which equals 1 at the beginning of each
trading period), and the signals they obtained for each asset. In the middle part, participants enter their
buying and selling prices for each of the assets; values between 50 and 150 needs to be entered, with buying
prices not being above the selling prices. At the bottom of the screen there are history boxes storing important
feedback on what happened before in the markets for the right and left asset.
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Figure 4: Feedback screen. The upper part of the screen is organized similar as in the decision screen. The
middle part contains information on all individuals their buying and asking prices (in the treatment without
SC information only information on own buying and selling prices are contained). The bottom part reports
important feedback on the consequences of the decisions in the markets for the right and left asset, such as:
the market price, the number of shares traded, whether you bought another share or sold the one you had
in stock, the number of shares left after trade, and the return on trade (which is negative in case an asset is
bought and positive in case an asset is sold). In the nonmarket treatments, the market price is labeled “group
value” and in addition the randomly drawn price at which exchange takes place is presented. The returns of
the assets are not learnt until the very end of the session.
Figure 5: Screen with final payment information. Participants are informed which repetition and trading
period are selected for final payment. For each of the assets, participants see how many shares they had after
trade and what they paid for buying another share or selling their share (or 0 if neither of the two happened)
in that respective repetition and trading period. Finally, the participants learn the value (return) of the assets.
All this information aggregates into a final payoff, that is presented (in ECU and excluding show-up fee) on
the last line.
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D Post-experimental Questionnaire
Cognitive ability For the cognition task, we used the symbol-digit correspondence test from the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), in which subjects had 90 seconds to find as many correspondences between
symbols and numbers as they could, using the correct number for each symbol (see Figure 6). Speed and
accuracy under time pressure determine an individuals ability (Dohmen et al., 2010).
Figure 6: Screenshot of cognitive ability test.
Demographics Participants answered the following questions:
1. What is your age?
2. What is your gender?
3. What is your origin?
4. What are you studying?
5. For how many years in total have you been studying at this or another university?
Risk attitude We elicited risk attitude using the direct approach as suggested in Dohmen et al. (2011).
Participants answered the question
How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do
you try to avoid taking risks?
on a ten-point scale running from “Not at all willing to take risks” to “Very willing to take risks”.
Machiavellianism The Machiavellianism score was elicited using the Mach-IV test (Christie and Geis,
1970). Participants indicate on a five-point Likert scale (running from “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree”) the degree to which they personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements:
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1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
4. Most people are basically good and kind.
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a
chance.
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
8. Generally speaking, people won’t work hard unless they’re forced to do so.
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishonest.
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather
than giving reasons which carry more weight.
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
13. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that the criminals are stupid enough
to get caught.
14. Most people are brave.
15. It is wise to flatter important people.
16. It is possible to be good in all respects.
17. P.T. Barnum was wrong when he said that there’s a sucker born every minute.
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.
19. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death.
20. Most people forget more easily the death of their parents than the loss of their property.
Items 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16 and 17 are reverse coded.
Competitiveness To assess the participants’ desire to win in interpersonal situations, we asked them to
indicate on a five-point Likert scale (running from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) their belief about
themselves concerning the following items:
1. I get satisfaction from competing with others.
2. I am a competitive individual.
3. I will do almost anything to avoid an argument.
4. I try to avoid competing with others.
5. I often remain quiet rather than risk hurting another person.
6. I find competitive situations unpleasant.
7. I try to avoid arguments.
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8. In general, I will go along with the group rather than create conflict.
9. I dont like competing against other people.
10. I dread competing against other people.
11. I enjoy competing against an opponent.
12. I often try to out perform others.
13. I like competition.
14. I dont enjoy challenging others even when I think they are wrong.
Responses to these 14 items aggregate in the Revised Competitiveness Index (Houston et al., 2002). Items
1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 capture the “Enjoyment of Competition”; items 3, 5, 7, 8 and 14 capture
“Contentiousness”. Items 3–10 and 14 are postulated in reverse.
Optimism To assess participants’ degree of optimism we use the Life Orientation Test–Revised (LOT-R)
as developed by Scheier et al. (1994). Participants indicated on a five-point Likert scale (running from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) their belief about themselves concerning the following items:
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
2. It’s easy for me to relax.
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will.
4. I’m always optimistic about my future.
5. I enjoy my friends a lot.
6. It’s important for me to keep busy.
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way.
8. I don’t get upset too easily.
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me.
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.
Items 3, 7 and 9 are reverse coded; items 2, 5, 6 and 8 are fillers.
Big Five The Big Five covers five broad dimensions of personality: openness, conscientiousness, extraver-
sion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Participants indicated on a five-point Likert
scale (running from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) their belief about themselves concerning the
following fifteen items as they are used in the German Socio-Economic Panel:
1. I am someone who does a thorough job.
2. I am someone who is communicative, talkative.
3. I am someone who is somewhat rude to others.
4. I am someone who is original and comes up with new ideas.
5. I am someone who worries a lot.
6. I am someone who has a forgiving nature.
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7. I am someone who tends to be lazy.
8. I am someone who is outgoing, sociable.
9. I am someone who values artistic experiences.
10. I am someone who gets nervous easily.
11. I am someone who does the things effectively and efficiently.
12. I am someone who is reserved.
13. I am someone who is considerate and kind to others.
14. I am someone who has an active imagination.
15. I am someone who is relaxed, handles stress well.
Items 4, 9 and 14 relate to the factor openness; items 1, 7 and 11 to conscientiousness; items 2, 8 and 12 to
extraversion; items 3, 6 and 13 to agreeableness; and items 5, 10 and 15 to neuroticism. Items 3, 7, 12 and
15 are stated in reversed form.
21
E Sample Information
In this section we provide some information about our sample. The experiments were conducted at the
BEElab at Maastricht University, where the subject pool consists mostly (but not uniquely) of undergraduate
students in areas such as law, business, arts and culture and liberal arts degrees. Most students are from
either Germany or the Netherlands, but there are also substantial shares of other European countries, as
well as a number of Asian, South- and North-American students (see Figure 7).
Market Market–SCinfo NonMarket NonMarket–SCinfo*
Gender (1=male) 0.425 0.550 0.375 0.400
[0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1]
Age 20.525 20.9 20.825 21.700
[18,24] [18,25] [18,25] [18,27]
Risk aversion 3.925 3.725 4.575 4.000
[2,9] [1,7] [0,9] [0,7]
Cognitive ability 43.9 39.02 38.55 41.2
[28,57] [23,52] [25,48] [31,53]
Machiavellianism 60.825 59 58.975 58.15
[48,74] [47,76] [46,75] [38,76]
Competitiveness 45.550 46.650 47.375 46.500
[26,68] [29,70] [20,70] [28,64]
Optimism 19.90 19.375 20.075 19.65
[11,28] [9,25] [11,30] [10,28]
Openness (B5) 10.550 10.825 10.775 10.600
[3,15] [6,15] [6,15] [6,13]
Conscientiousness (B5) 9.875 10.025 10.675 10.800
[5,14] [5,15] [5,15] [5,15]
Extraversion (B5) 10.850 10.725 11.025 11.150
[5,15] [6,15] [5,15] [5,14]
Agreeableness (B5) 10.95 11.025 11.15 11.85
[6,14] [6,14] [6,15] [8,15]
Neuroticism (B5) 8.8 9.175 8.7 9
[3,15] [4,15] [3,15] [5,15]
* Half of the questionnaire data in this treatment were lost due to a server crash.
Table 3: Mean and range for a number of variables.
Table 3 summarizes some statistics (mean and range) of our sample. The information on sample charac-
teristics was collected in a post experimental questionnaire, and unfortunately for the treatment NonMarket–
SCinfo, questionnaire data were lost for half of the participants due to a server crash. With this caveat, our
sample appears gender balanced across all treatments with the share of men ranging between 37–55%. On
average participants are about 21 years old, but age ranges between 18 and 27. The table also reports a
number of measures on risk aversion, cognitive ability, machiavellianism, competitiveness and optimism as
well as the Big5 personality traits elicited as described in detail in Appendix D.
Figure 8 illustrates the cdfs for age, risk aversion and cognitive ability, Machiavellianism, competitiveness
and optimism. The figure illustrates that, despite some differences in means, the overall distributions do not
substantially differ; only on cognitive ability participants in the Market treatment seem to score somewhat
higher, though there are no differences between our key treatments Market–SCinfo and Nonmarket–SCinfo
(p = 0.2135, two-sided ranksum test based on n = 60 observations). Figure 9 illustrates the cdfs for the
Big5 personality traits. Again, there are no notable differences across treatments. Table 8 in Appendix G
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includes all controls in our main regression (Equation (1)) and shows that coefficient sizes β1 +β3 and β2 +β3
as well as statistical significance tend to increase after including all 11 variables from the questionnaire as
controls.
(a) Market (b) Market–SCinfo
(c) NonMarket (d) NonMarket–SCinfo
Figure 7: Country or region of participants’ nationalities.
(a) Age (b) Risk aversion measure (c) Cognitive ability
(d) Machiavellianism (e) Competitiveness (f) Optimism
Figure 8: A number of sample characteristics (cdfs).
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(a) Openness (B5) (b) Conscientiousness (B5) (c) Extraversion (B5)
(d) Agreeableness (B5) (e) Neuroticism (B5)
Figure 9: A number of sample characteristics (cdfs).
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F Social Comparison in Markets
Assume player i holds the high risk asset and player j the low risk asset, then i’s utility is given by
V HRi = η EU
HR + ψ
[
7
25v(0) +
6
25v (u(50)− u(100)) + 225v (u(50)− u(150)) + 125v (u(100)− u(50))
+ 125v (u(100)− u(150)) + 225v (u(150)− u(50)) + 625v (u(150)− u(100))
]
.
For the low risk asset the expression is analogous. The risk premium RP should then equal
RP = V LRi − V HRi
= η
(
EULR − EUHR)+ ψ [ 525 {v (u(100)− u(50))− v (u(50)− u(100))
+v (u(100)− u(150))− v (u(150)− u(100))
}]
.
Or, when denoting y = u(100)− u(50) and x = u(150)− u(100),
RP = η
(
EULR − EUHR)+ 15 ψ [ v (y)− v (−y) + v (−x)− v (x) ],
where y ≥ x > 0 by concavity of u. The term in the squared brackets is nonnegative if v is linear or strictly
convex in the loss domain and concave in the gains domain.2 Hence, RP is increasing in ψ.
2Because of loss aversion we know that |v′(x)| < |v′(−x)|. Convexity in the loss domain means |v′(x)| < |v′(−y)|.
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G Additional Tables
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics (mean and range across all 30 periods) for a number of different variables.
It can be seen that the risk premium is highest in the market treatment with SC information and that this
is due to both a higher ask and a higher bid premium (defined as the difference between asks and bids,
respectively, between the less risky and more risky asset). Prices tend to be somewhat lower in the market
treatments, mostly due to lower asks, but the differences are relatively small. The volume of trade is highest
in the market treatment without SC information and decreases both as SC information is added or market
interaction is taken away. In all treatments and groups there was at least one trade in each round, though
not always both assets were traded.
Market Market–SCinfo NonMarket NonMarket–SCinfo
Bid low risk asset 62.98 70.14 68.31 70.27
[50, 150] [50, 150] [50, 150] [50, 150]
Ask low risk asset 79.96 92.78 93.70 97.61
[50, 150] [50, 150] [50, 150] [50, 150]
Price low risk asset 67.06 76.90 77.71 80.90
[50, 125] [50, 110] [52.5, 122.5] [57.5, 122]
Bid high risk asset 63.16 66.26 69.05 70.00
[50, 150] [50, 149] [50, 150] [50, 150]
Ask high risk asset 81.14 89.52 92.80 100.13
[50, 150] [50, 150] [50, 150] [50, 150]
Price high risk asset 66.14 71.99 76.71 81.58
[50, 105] [50, 109] [50, 125] [53, 122]
Bid premium 0.17 3.88 −0.73 0.27
[−100, 100] [−75, 100] [−100, 100] [−95, 99]
Ask premium −1.18 3.26 0.90 −2.51
[−100, 100] [100, 100] [−100, 100] [−97, 100]
Risk premium 1.08 5.59 1.16 −0.48
[−33.5, 35] [−27.5, 45] [−42.5, 42.5] [−37.5, 33]
Quantity traded low risk asset 1.70 1.58 1.36 1.17
[0, 3] [0, 4] [0, 3] [0, 2]
Quantity traded high risk asset 1.90 1.60 1.53 1.23
[0, 4] [0, 3] [0, 3] [0, 2]
Total number of trades 868 766 697 577
Table 4: Mean and range for a number of variables.
Table 5 shows the results of running regression (1) separately for the two signal distributions ρ1 and ρ2
(see Table 2). It can be seen that the effects uncovered above are driven mainly by signal distribution ρ2,
though the direction of the effects is the same under ρ1 (see also Figure 10). This suggests that information
matters for the size of the effect, though the direction is the same under both distributions.
Table 6 shows a regression, where instead of risk premia we regress price on our market and SC in-
formation dummies. The table shows that prices for the high risk asset in the market treatment with SC
information are lower than those in the corresponding nonmarket treatment (β1 + β3 < 0) and that SC
information increases prices for the low risk asset in the market setting, but not the nonmarket setting
(β2 + β3 > 0; β2 = 0). It also shows that in the absence of SC information market prices for all assets are
lower under the market condition compared to the nonmarket condition.
Table 7 shows the evolution of the risk premium over time in the different treatments. Even columns
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 26–30 All 26–30
Constant (α) 1.140 2.700 −0.196 1.294
(4.472) (5.652) (3.087) (5.424)
Market (β1) 0.231 −2.900 2.915 −0.321
(5.123) (6.047) (5.068) (4.623)
SCinfo (β2) −2.601 −2.630 0.738 −4.371
(3.908) (4.316) (2.822) (8.251)
SCinfo × Market (β3) 3.802 10.13∗ 6.030 16.10∗∗∗
(4.523) (6.133) (5.796) (5.829)
β1 + β3 4.033 7.230 8.945
∗∗∗ 15.779∗∗∗
p-value test β1 + β3 = 0 0.457 0.537 0.005 < 0.001
β2 + β3 1.201 7.500 6.768 11.729
p-value test β2 + β3 = 0 0.770 0.325 0.152 0.148
Observations 440 76 440 76
Number of groups 32 16 32 16
Signal ρ1 ρ1 ρ2 ρ2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 5: Risk premium regressed on market and SC information dummies separately for ρ1 and ρ2.
Low risk asset High risk asset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 26–30 All 26–30
Constant (α) 77.65∗∗∗ 76.42∗∗∗ 76.63∗∗∗ 74.38∗∗∗
(2.843) (3.216) (2.672) (4.576)
Market (β1) −10.32∗∗∗ −12.91∗∗∗ −10.51∗∗∗ −11.22
(3.813) (4.853) (3.352) (7.024)
SCinfo (β2) 3.585 3.125 5.269 7.046
(4.181) (5.671) (4.544) (9.189)
SCinfo × Market (β3) 6.087 9.388 0.769 −4.183
(6.239) (10.94) (5.167) (10.86)
β1 + β3 −4.322 −3.522 −9.741∗∗∗ −15.403∗∗
p-value test β1 + β3 = 0 0.167 0.620 0.007 0.041
β2 + β3 9.672
∗∗ 12.513∗ 6.038 2.863
p-value test β2 + β3 = 0 0.045 0.091 0.108 0.601
Observations 911 159 929 153
Number of groups 32 32 32 32
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 6: Market prices for the two assets.
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Market Market–SCinfo NonMarket NonMarket–SCinfo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 4.401 2.331 −0.202 1.492 −0.626 −0.111 4.833 1.215
(9.979) (4.390) (9.100) (4.686) (5.812) (3.508) (15.86) (4.349)
Repetition −0.908 1.675 −1.577 −2.901
(3.719) (3.132) (2.457) (6.288)
Trading period (TP) −0.390 0.174 0.388 −0.491
(1.123) (1.325) (0.520) (2.270)
Repetition × TP 0.057 0.126 0.078 0.428
(0.430) (0.458) (0.266) (0.891)
Period −0.082 0.258 −0.041 −0.010
(0.186) (0.190) (0.209) (0.219)
Observations 233 227 199 221
Number of groups 8 8 8 8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 7: Evolution of risk premium over time.
simply regress risk premium on period (1–30). Odd columns regress risk premium on “Trading period”
(1–10), “Repetition” (1–3) as well as their interaction. The table shows that while risk premia tend to
increase over time in Market–SCinfo, they tend to decrease in all other treatments, even though none of
these trends appears statistically significant.
Table 8 repeats the regression from Equation (1), but includes in even columns all 11 variables elicited
in the post experimental questionnaire described in Appendix D (descriptive statistics on these variables
can be found in Appendix E). A number of characteristics affect the risk premium: risk aversion and
cognitive ability of market participants tend to increase risk premia, while optimism, conscientiousness and
neuroticism tend to decrease the risk premium. The risk premium is also lower if there are more male
participants in a market. Importantly, our coefficients of interest (β1 + β3 and β2 + β3) do not change
much when questionnaire variables are included. If at all, effect sizes tend to increase upon including
controls. Including the controls from the questionnaire also improves statistical significance, despite a loss
of observations due to missing questionnaire variables for one session (see Appendix D).
Comparing odd and even columns suggests that multicollinearity does not seem too much of an is-
sue. Table 9 shows pairwise correlation coefficients between questionnaire variables at the individual level
across all treatments (n = 140). The table shows that generally correlation coefficients tend to be small
and statistically insignificant. A few variables are significantly correlated however: men tend to be less
risk averse (ρ = −0.270), more competitive (ρ = 0.317) and less neurotic (ρ = −0.344) than women. In
addition neuroticism is positively correlated with risk aversion and negatively with optimism and extraver-
sion. Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with optimism and agreeableness. At the matching group
level only three of these correlations survive as statistically significant: the negative correlation between
neuroticism and gender and optimism, respectively and the negative correlation between agreeableness and
machiavellianism. Overall, Table 9 together with the fact that effect sizes and direction of our main variables
are not affected too much by including questionnaire variables make us confident that multi-collinearity is
not too much of a problem in the regression displayed in Table 8. The condition number for all thirteen
variables reported in Table 9 is 81.5692, which is below the cutoff of 100 mentioned in Cameron and Trivedi
(2005).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All 26–30 26–30
Constant (α) 1.042 88.19∗∗∗ 2.034 33.80
(2.094) (30.64) (3.590) (59.53)
Market (β1) 0.008 −3.608 −1.642 −3.527
(3.121) (2.892) (3.516) (3.645)
SCinfo (β2) −1.982 1.321 −3.480 −4.666
(1.617) (4.480) (4.241) (5.133)
SCinfo × Market (β3) 6.556∗∗ 11.11∗ 13.09∗∗∗ 20.72∗∗∗
(3.151) (5.939) (4.028) (5.705)
Gender −15.99∗∗ −10.87∗
(5.714) (6.536)
Age −2.058 2.683
(1.623) (1.831)
Risk aversion 2.803∗∗ 3.946∗∗∗
(1.374) (1.499)
Cognitive ability 1.002∗∗∗ 1.087∗
(0.249) 0.583
Machiavellianism −0.268 −0.714∗∗
(0.218) (0.324)
Competitiveness 0.312∗ 0.558∗∗
(0.164) (0.268)
Optimism −1.745∗∗ −2.657∗∗
(0.696) (1.046)
Openness (B5) 3.742∗∗ 1.310
(1.734) (1.392)
Conscientiousness (B5) −3.662∗∗∗ −5.390∗∗∗
(0.989) (1.000)
Extraversion (B5) 1.492 3.552∗∗
(1.440) (1.388)
Agreeableness (B5) −1.876 0.209
(2.941) (0.970)
Neuroticism (B5) −5.793∗∗∗ −8.342∗∗∗
(1.144) (1.268)
β1 + β3 6.564
∗ 7.502∗∗ 11.448∗∗ 17.193∗∗∗
p-value test β2 + β3 = 0 0.073 0.041 0.044 < 0.001
β2 + β3 4.574 12.431
∗∗∗ 9.610∗ 16.054∗∗∗
p-value test β2 + β3 = 0 0.195 < 0.001 0.063 < 0.001
Observations 880 779 152 134
Number of groups 32 28 32 28
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 8: Random effects OLS regression including controls from post-experimental questionnaire (averaged
for matching groups).
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
gender (a) 1
age (b) 0.165 1
risk aversion (c) −0.270∗ −0.036 1
Machiavellianism (d) 0.112 −0.027 −0.052 1
competitiveness (e) 0.317∗ 0.026 −0.192 0.113 1
optimism (f) 0.064 0.032 −0.067 −0.235∗ 0.118 1
openness (g) 0.091 0.015 −0.076 0.035 0.162 0.058 1
conscientiousness (h) −0.218 0.015 −0.014 −0.068 0.177 0.189 0.198 1
extraversion (i) −0.025 −0.109 −0.136∗ 0.033 0.159 0.006 0.451 0.221∗ 1
agreeableness (j) 0.023 0.024 −0.094 −0.292∗ −0.013 0.163 0.057 0.257∗ 0.118 1
neuroticism (k) −0.344∗ −0.064 0.236∗ 0.050 −0.172 −0.552∗ 0.006 0.013 −0.140∗ 0.072 1
cognitive ability (l) −0.039 −0.060∗ −0.149 0.083 0.083 0.112∗ 0.076 −0.042 −0.014 0.091 0.010 1
∗ indicates significance at the 1% level.
Table 9: Pairwise correlation coefficients between questionnaire variables at the individual level across all
treatments.
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H Additional Figures
Figure 10 shows the risk premium over time for the two different signal distributions. The figure illustrates a
pattern noted in Table 5 in Appendix G: with SC information risk premia are higher in the market compared
to the nonmarket condition. This effect is obtained under both signal distribution, but is stronger under ρ2,
where more participants receive a pair of signals suggesting that the high risk asset yields higher returns.
(a) without SC info; signal distr ρ1 (b) with SC info; signal distr ρ1
(c) without SC info; signal distr ρ2 (d) with SC info; signal distr ρ2
Figure 10: Risk premium for different signal distributions.
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I Alternative Nonmarket Treatment
We also conducted a second nonmarket treatment variation, where instead of using the BDM mechanism
to generate a price, we ask participants to correctly predict the expected value of the asset using the “Most
Likely Interval elicitation rule” (Schlag and van der Weele, 2015). Figure 11 shows the risk premium over
time including these alternative nonmarket treatments and illustrates qualitatively similar patterns. More
details on this treatment and results are available upon request.
(a) without SC information (b) with SC information
Figure 11: Risk premium including the alternative nonmarket treatments.
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